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Abstract. In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter
model in the presence of biased voters (or zealots) on complex networks.
Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget
who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target zealots? Our
analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich
diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to zealots
and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have
a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should
give larger allocations to zealots and allocations are positively correlated
with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots,
optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some
residual allocations to zealots, and allocations to both types of agents
decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in
agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on
heterogeneous networks.
Keywords: Influence maximization · Voter model · Zealots · Complex
networks.
1 Introduction
Perhaps motivated by the increasing prevalence of social media and their influ-
ence on public opinion, processes of opinion formation on social networks have
found much attention in the recent literature [1,9]. Models in this domain have
addressed general properties of opinion diffusion on static and co-evolving net-
works (refer to, e.g., [8,30] for reviews), but also basic mechanisms underlying
phenomena such as radicalization [27] and the role of external influence [12,25].
Whilst typical models of opinion formation often include the role of external
influence, another relevant aspect is the question of its placing, a problem that
has been termed influence maximization (IM ). Influence maximization has huge
relevance for a variety of important applications that range from advertising [13],
political and public information campaigns [31,34], to questions on how to opti-
mally encourage a developing economy [2]. Starting with [18], the above problem
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has a huge pedigree in the computer science literature and has traditionally been
studied in the context of the independent cascade (IC) model [15] or variants
thereof such as threshold models [16]. In the typical problem setting for IC-like
models, one seeks optimal seed nodes from which a one-off cascade can reach as
large as possible a part of the social network.
More recent examples of strategically exerted interference on social media
aiming at disrupting the democratic process [23,4] have sparked the interest of
influence maximization on election events [32]. Here, we want a mechanism of
opinion formation in which the agents can repeatedly change their opinion. In
contrast to the typical IC literature, where flips of opinion only occur in one
direction, these models are more suitable for volatile opinions or longer time
frames, as these conditions fit better the political domain. In the following, we
focus on the voter model (VM) [11,17] because of its simplicity and prominence
in the literature. A key feature of the VM is its linearity, which makes it possible
to establish many of its properties [28]. Previous work on the VM has also con-
sidered aspects of agent heterogeneity. For this purpose, existing literature has
introduced so-called zealots, i.e. agents that have decreased chances of adopt-
ing particular opinions. The VM has been studied with perfect zealots whose
opinions are completely unaffected by other individuals [24,19,22] (also referred
to as “inflexible”, “committed”, “stubborn” or “frozen”) and imperfect zealots
[21] (also “partisans”), who can change their opinion albeit changes are biased
towards one of the opinions. Dynamics including zealots from different opinions
typically result in mixed equilibrium states.
Previous work on influence maximization in the VM initially sought the ini-
tial opinion distribution in the network that would lead to the preferred opinion
in the consensus state with the highest probability [14]. However, in the presence
of zealots equilibrium states of the VM are independent of initial opinion dis-
tributions, so later works shifted the goal to optimally transforming nodes into
zealots to reach improved mixed-equilibrium states [19,33]. Another approach,
more akin to problems in network control [20,26], regards zealots as external
controllers who optimally build unidirectional influence links (edges) to nodes in
the network [22,6,7]. In this approach, external controllers can be seen as polit-
ical parties, mass media or advertising companies that must choose the targets
of their campaign policies.
As pointed out by Aral and Dhillon [3], past approaches to influence maxi-
mization often overlook aspects of heterogeneity in agent behavior. Specifically,
in the context of the IC, it has been shown that results of IM are strongly affected
by agents’ susceptibility to adopt opinions [3] —or, translated into the context
of the VM, zealotry. However, whereas demonstrating that zealotry influences
optimal allocations in the IM, Aral and Dhillon [3] have not explored detailed
mechanisms for such differences. Here, we extend previous work on IM for the
voter model with external controllers by considering the effects of different lev-
els of imperfect zealotry in the population. An optimal campaign manager with
limited resources would never target perfect zealots whose opinions cannot be
influenced. However, under what conditions would she target imperfect zealots
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and how does this relate to the zealot’s topological position in the social net-
work? Below, we shall explore these questions for different network topologies.
As zealots represent partly radicalized agents, answers to the questions might
help to find ways of reducing radicalism in social systems.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the proposed IM
problem and introduces solution methods. Section 3 first presents analytical and
numerical solutions to the problem on simple graph topologies and later extends
the analysis to scale-free networks. Section 4 discusses and summarizes our main
conclusions.
2 Model and methods
We introduce a scenario where an external controller wants to influence a group
of N individuals connected via a social network. We assume individuals hold
binary opinions oi ∈ {A,B}, i = 1, . . . , N and define xi as the probability of
node i holding opinion A. Opinion diffusion occurs following the usual VM,
where a random node copies the opinion of a random neighbor at each time-
step. We assume nodes have a bias against opinion A, which we model by an
intrinsic level of zealotry qi ∈ [0, 1] that gives the probability of not copying
opinion A from a neighbor j who holds oj = A. Below, we are interested in
optimal strategies for an external controller who wants to promote opinion A in
the network. As in [22,6,7], a controller is modeled as a node with fixed opinion
that exerts influence by establishing unidirectional links to nodes in the network
with a specific link weight ai > 0. Overall, the controller wants to optimize the
allocation of the ai to maximize her vote share, subject to a budget constraint
Ba ≥
∑
i ai. Note that, unlike previous work, we relax the conditions on the ai
by allowing them to adopt any value within R.
To proceed, we write rate equations for the probabilities of nodes holding
opinion A, which evolve according to
dxi
dt
= (1 − qi) (1− xi)
∑
j wijxj + ai
ki + ai
− xi
∑
j wij(1 − xj)
ki + ai
, (1)
where W = (wij) is the weighted adjacency matrix and ki =
∑
j wij is the
weighted in-degree of node i. Note that the left term on the right-hand side
of the equation accounts for the probability of a node holding opinion B and
copying the opinion of a neighbor with A (which is reduced by the level of
zealotry qi), while the right term reflects the opposite situation.
We focus on influence maximization in the expected equilibrium state, which
is unique and asymptotically reached irrespective of initial conditions [33]. The
probabilities of adoptingA in equilibrium, x∗i , can be determined from dxi/dt = 0,
leading to the system of N second-order equations
0 = (1− qi)
∑
j
wijx
∗
j + qi x
∗
i
∑
j
wijx
∗
j − x∗i (ki + (1− qi) ai) + (1− qi) ai . (2)
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Since this system of equations is hard to solve numerically, the vote shares in the
equilibrium state can alternatively be found by performing numerical integration
of (1).
The external controller aims to distribute her unidirectional connections in
such a way as to maximize the expected vote share in equilibriumX∗ = 1
N
∑
i x
∗
i ,
leading to the optimization problem
max
a
X∗(W,a, q) s.t. Ba ≥
∑
i
ai , ai ≥ 0 . (3)
As we lack an explicit expression for the total vote shareX∗ on general networks,
we resort to numerical methods for the optimization process. The continuous
definition of influence allocations allows gradient ascent techniques [29], for which
we need to compute the gradient of the equilibrium vote share with respect to
the allocations, ∇aX∗. By applying partial derivatives on (2), we obtain the
gradients as
0 = (1 − qi)
∑
j
wij
∂x∗j
∂al
+ qi

∂x∗i
∂al
∑
j
wijx
∗
j + x
∗
i
∑
j
wij
∂x∗j
∂al

−
− ∂x
∗
i
∂al
[ki + (1− qi) ai] + δi,l(1 − qi)(1 − x∗i ) ,
∇aX∗ = 1
N
(∇ax∗)T1 = 1
N
diag [(1− qi)(1− x∗i )] [diag(ki + (1− qi) ai)−
− diag (qi) diag(Wx∗)−Wdiag(1− qi + qix∗i )]−1 1 , (4)
where δi,l is the Kronecker delta and the values of x
∗ are computed via numerical
integration, as explained above.
3 Results
To gain intuition about the role of zealots in influence maximization in the VM
and have some analytical reference, we first explore simple graph topologies in
Sec. 3.1. We then extend the experiments to networks with heterogeneous degree
distributions in Sec. 3.2, as their network structure is closer to the ones found
in real social network data.
3.1 Simple Network Topologies
Complete Graph. We start with an infinite complete graph where a fraction ρ
of nodes are zealots with equal level of zealotry qz and the rest of the nodes are
normal (unbiased) agents with qn = 0. We assume that the external controller
allocates the same link strength to all nodes within a group, where az and an
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are the weights of link allocations to zealots and normal agents as a fraction of
nodes in the network. Inserting the budget constraint, we find
Ba/N2 = 〈a〉 = ρ az + (1− ρ) an = α〈a〉+ (1 − α)〈a〉 ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the unique decision parameter for the distribution of the
budget among zealots and normal agents. The whole influence budget is focused
on normal agents when α = 0, on zealots when α = 1, and link weights are equal
for agents in both groups when α = ρ.
The total vote share in the equilibrium for these settings can easily be derived
from the rate equation in (1), leading to
X∗ = ρ x∗z + (1− ρ)x∗n =
〈a〉
qzρ
(α− α qz)〈a〉(1 − α) + (1 − ρ)ρ(1− α qz)
〈a〉(1− α) + (1− ρ)ρ , (5)
with a boundary at X∗ = 1. The vote share generally increases with budget
availability 〈a〉 and decreases with the fraction of zealots ρ and their level of
zealotry qz. Optimal allocations α
∗ can be found by solving ∂X∗/∂α = 0, giving
α∗ = 1− ρ(1− ρ)〈a〉
(
1√
1− qz − 1
)
, (6)
which is bounded at α∗= 0. This result shows that, for a given share of zealots ρ,
optimal allocations target zealots the more the bigger the budget 〈a〉 and the
smaller the level of zealotry qz. We can find the switching point of zealotry q
∗
z
at which normal agents start to be favored over zealots, corresponding to
q∗z = 1−
(
1
〈a〉/ρ+ 1
)2
, (7)
which increases with the budget 〈a〉 and decreases with the density of zealots ρ.
We use the analytical solutions developed above to evaluate the quality of
numerical results obtained via gradient ascentas introduced in Sec. 2. For this
purpose, we analyze how (normalized) optimal allocations to zealots a∗z/〈a〉 =
α∗/ρ vary with the level of zealotry qz and budget size 〈a〉 for both methods
(Fig. 1–left) and observe the resulting equilibrium vote shares X∗ (Fig. 1–right).
We note that for low values of zealotry qz or high budget 〈a〉, the controller
achieves full controlX∗= 1 by both methods despite differences in their solutions
of optimal strategy. Numerical results are initialized at targeting the two groups
of agents equally (az = an) and deviate from this allocation in the direction of
the gradient the minimum required to achieve X∗ = 1. Conversely, analytical
optimizations do not take into account the boundary at X∗= 1 and provide the
most robust strategy. For higher values of qz or lower budgets 〈a〉 —where full
control is not possible— allocation strategies from both methods are found to be
in perfect agreement, as well as the equilibrium vote shares achieved by them.
In general, optimal strategies favor allocations to zealots over allocations
to normal agents for low values of qz and high values of 〈a〉. This behavior
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Fig. 1. Normalized link allocations given to zealots (left) and resulting equilibrium
vote shares (right) obtained via analytical (dashed) and numerical (solid) methods on
a complete network for varying zealotry qz and varying budget 〈a〉 = Ba/N
2. The
network has size N = 100, with 20% of zealots with zealotry qz and 80% of normal
agents with qn = 0. The horizontal line (orange) represents equal link weights given to
both groups. Numerical and analytical results for the vote share are in almost perfect
agreement at all explored points.
gradually decreases with qz , switching to favoring normal agents at some q
∗
z
(in the figure, crossing the horizontal orange line) and fully avoiding zealots
(a∗z = 0) at another critical level of zealotry q
∗∗
z . Both critical points depend on
the available budget 〈a〉. Equilibrium vote shares reach full control X∗ = 1 for
low values of qz , experience a steep drop just after leaving the full control regime
and gradually decelerate in their decrease as qz increases.
Bipartite Graphs. Next, as a way to explore the interplay of degree hetero-
geneity with zealotry, we explore complete bipartite graphs, i.e. graphs divided
into two groups where all nodes from a group are connected to all nodes in the
other group. We assume that nodes in the smaller group (hubs) comprise a frac-
tion ρ < 0.5 of the total network and have zealotry qh, while nodes from the
larger group (periphery) have zealotry qp = 1 − qh. The equilibrium vote share
for this case is given by
X∗=
〈a〉
qhρ
(α− αqh)α〈a〉+ ρρ(1−αqh)
α〈a〉+ ρρ(1 + qh/q2h)
+
〈a〉
qh ρ
(α− α qh)α〈a〉+ ρρ(1−αqh)
α〈a〉+ ρρ(1 + qh/qh2)
, (8)
where, for convenience of notation, overlined symbols mean γ = 1− γ and there
is again a boundary at X∗ = 1. Optimal allocations α∗ can again be found by
solving ∂X∗/∂α = 0, which results in a fourth-order polynomial equation that
we evaluate numerically.
Figure 2 analyzes optimal allocations given to zealots on a bipartite network
for the level of zealotry defined above, obtained with both analytical and numer-
ical methods. Figure 2–left gives (normalized) optimal link allocations to hubs
a∗h/〈a〉 = α∗/ρ for different levels of zealotry qh and budget size 〈a〉. We note
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that, for a large budget (blue line), there is a consistent preference in alloca-
tions toward hub nodes regardless of which group holds a higher level of zealotry
—except in the limit of hubs with almost-perfect zealotry (qh ≈ 1). On the con-
trary, for a low budget (green line), optimal allocations quickly switch from fully
targeting hubs to fully targeting periphery nodes, even when the level of zealotry
of hubs is larger than that of periphery nodes (qh < qp). Figure 2–right gives
the resulting equilibrium vote shares X∗ for optimal allocations. We note that,
for low budgets (green lines), the vote shares obtained in optimal allocations
are higher when zealots are concentrated on hubs. For high budgets (blue lines),
moderate levels of zealotry in both groups (qz ≈ qh ≈ 0.5) lead to higher vote
shares from optimal allocations.
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Fig. 2. Normalized influence allocations given to hubs (left) and resulting equilibrium
vote shares (right) for different levels of zealotry and budget availability 〈a〉 obtained
via analytical (dashed) and numerical (solid) methods on a bipartite network of size
N = 100. Hubs, with zealotry qh, compose 20% of the network, while periphery nodes
compose the remaining 80% and have zealotry qp = 1−qh. Optimal influence allocations
from numerical methods are omitted when X∗ = 1 for improved clarity of the graph.
Resulting equilibrium vote shares from numerical and analytical approaches match
almost perfectly (see overlapping lines).
To summarize our findings on simple network topologies, we have seen that
influence allocations to zealots are preferred when their level of zealotry is low
or the available budget is high, while allocations to normal agents are preferred
otherwise. When nodes of different degrees are present, allocations to hubs are
preferred over periphery nodes when the budget availability is high, even when
the level of zealotry of hubs is higher than that of periphery nodes. In contrast,
for low budgets, higher influence allocations to periphery nodes can be preferable
in cases where their level of zealotry is higher than that of hubs.
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3.2 Scale-Free Networks. Zealotry and Node Degree
Next, we focus on Barabasi-Albert (BA) networks [5] to further explore how the
interplay of zealotry and node degree affects optimal targeting on heterogeneous
networks. For our experiments, we generate networks following preferential at-
tachment rules with every new node linking to two existing ones (leading to
networks with 〈k〉≈ 4) and then we allow a random sample of the population to
become zealots with uniform zealotry qz , while keeping the remaining nodes as
normal agents.
We first explore general behaviors by looking at average optimal allocations
given to zealots and the resulting equilibrium vote shares (Fig. 3). We note
remarkable similarities between the results obtained here and those for the com-
plete graph (Fig. 1) regarding both optimal allocations and equilibrium vote
shares. Note that, while for the complete graph the per-node average allocation
is expressed as fractions of nodes in the network (〈a〉 = Ba/N2), we take ab-
solute values for the experiments on BA-networks (〈a〉 = Ba/N). This results
in a re-scaling of 〈k〉/N for exerting a similar influence on BA-networks than
on complete networks, as discussed in [10]. Again, zealot targeting is preferred
when levels of zealotry are low or the available budgets are high. The preference
slowly shifts to normal agents as qz increases, eventually assigning them higher
influence links (at q∗z) and even focusing the whole budget on them (at q
∗∗
z ).
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Fig. 3. Average optimal allocations given to zealots (left) and resulting equilibrium
vote shares (right) on BA networks for varying zealotry qz and varying per-node budget
〈a〉 = Ba/N . Networks are of size N = 1000, mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 4, and with a random
sub-sample of 20% of the network becoming zealots. Every point is the average over 50
realizations of the experiment, with error bars giving three standard deviations from
the mean. Optimal allocations that lead to full control are plotted with a thinner line.
The horizontal line (orange) represents equal link weights given to both groups.
We next analyze the relationship between optimal allocations and node de-
gree. More specifically, we want to find whether the link preferences to zealots or
normal agents are uniformly held across different node degrees. Figure 4 displays
optimal allocations a∗k grouped by node degree k for a given budget 〈a〉 = 〈k〉/16
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and three different zealotry parameters qz = 0.3, 0.5, 0.9. We note clear correla-
tions between optimal allocations and node degree in most cases. When the level
of zealotry is relatively low (qz = 0.3, yellow), the external controller exhibits a
clear allocation preference to high-degree nodes, among both zealots and normal
agents. For intermediate levels of zealotry (qz = 0.5, orange) optimal controls
omit allocations to high-degree zealots, while mildly target zealots with the low-
est degree. This behavior relates to our findings for complete bipartite graphs
above, where zealots at the periphery were preferred over hub zealots for low
budgets and mild zealotry values. High-degree nodes are still preferred among
normal agents in this scenario (right panel) . Last, when zealots are highly stub-
born (qz = 0.9, red), they remain untargeted, as well as normal agents on hubs,
while the correlation with node degree generally decreases.
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Fig. 4. Average per-degree allocations given to zealots (left) and normal agents (right)
depending on the node degree k and for three values of qz and budget 〈a〉 = 〈k〉/16 on
a BA-network size N = 5000. Each point is the mean allocation over all nodes of same
degree, with error bars denoting three standard deviations from the mean.
We extend the correlation analysis in Fig. 4 to a wider range of zealotry
values and available budgets. Figure 5 shows the Pearson correlations between
a∗k and k on BA-networks for different scenarios. We note again clear patterns
that are in agreement with Fig. 4: hubs are preferred when levels of zealotry are
low, with the preference decreasing with qz and switching to periphery nodes at
some q∗z . The switching points are lower for zealots than for normal agents and
increase with budget availability. Correlations on zealot allocations eventually
reach zero, marking the point where they are fully untargeted.
Combining the information from average allocations given to zealots (Fig. 3)
and average per-degree allocations given to both groups (Fig. 5), we obtain the
following general pattern. When levels of zealotry are low (but not enough for
achieving full control of the network), targeting zealots is preferred over targeting
normal agents and hubs receive more allocation within each group. Preferences
for zealots and zealot hubs diminish as the level of zealotry increases, going
through three different transition points. The first transition point q∗z marks a
10 G. Romero Moreno et al.
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Fig. 5. Pearson correlations between per-degree optimal allocations a∗k and node degree
k for zealots (left) and normal agents (right) for different values of 〈a〉 and qz on BA-
networks of size N = 1000. Each point is the average correlation over 50 runs of the
experiment with error bars accounting for three standard deviations from the mean,
both computed in the Fisher transformation domain. Correlations are only shown for
situations in which full control (X∗ = 1) is not achieved. All p-values fall below 10−20.
shift of preference of allocations to normal agents over zealots and preference to
zealot with low degree over zealot hubs. After the second transition point q∗∗, no
allocation is given to zealots and the preference for hubs among normal agents
starts to diminish. After the last transition point q∗∗∗z , low-degree nodes are
preferred over hubs among normal agents.
4 Conclusions
We have explored influence maximization on heterogeneous networks with zealots
biased against the opinion of an external controller. Based on numerical exper-
iments and analytical treatment, a general pattern in optimal influence allo-
cations can be noted. We find that nodes that are harder to control (zealots)
receive more influence allocation when the controller’s budget is large, while
nodes that are easier to control (normal agents) receive more allocation when
the budget is small. The transition point between both regimes depends on the
level of zealotry and fraction of zealots in the network. When networks with
heterogeneous degree distributions are studied, a richer hierarchy emerges, with
the following groups —sorted by their difficulty to be controlled in decreasing
order—: zealot hubs, periphery zealots, hub normal agents, and periphery nor-
mal agents. Our findings fit in the general picture of previous literature which
has found that optimal allocations tend to depend on a trade-off between budget
availability and the difficulty to control nodes [6,29,7].
Although we have uncovered the essential effects that different levels of
zealotry have on influence maximization, some additional research questions re-
main open. For instance, a natural extension to this work could include zealots
of both opinions and heterogeneous levels of zealotry in the same network. Sim-
ilarly, the presence of two opposing external controllers would also be of high
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interest, as real social influence scenarios tend to include various actors that
compete to spread their exclusive opinions. We plan to explore these questions
in future work.
References
1. Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A.: Opinion Dynamics and Learning in So-
cial Networks. Dynamic Games and Applications 1(1), 3–49 (mar 2011).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1
2. Alshamsi, A., Pinheiro, F.L., Hidalgo, C.A.: Optimal diversification strategies in
the networks of related products and of related research areas. Nature Communi-
cations 9(1), 1328 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-03740-9
3. Aral, S., Dhillon, P.S.: Social influence maximization under empirical influence
models. Nature Human Behaviour 2, 375–382 (2018)
4. Badawy, A., Ferrara, E., Lerman, K.: Analyzing the digital traces of
political manipulation: The 2016 russian interference twitter campaign.
In: 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social
Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM). pp. 258–265 (Aug 2018).
https://doi.org/10.1109/ASONAM.2018.8508646
5. Baraba´si, A.L., Albert, R.: Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science
286(5439), 509–512 (oct 1999)
6. Brede, M., Restocchi, V., Stein, S.: Resisting influence: How the strength of pre-
dispositions to resist control can change strategies for optimal opinion control in
the voter model. Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5, 34 (2018)
7. Brede, M., Restocchi, V., Stein, S.: Effects of time horizons on influence maximiza-
tion in the voter dynamics. Journal of Complex Networks 7(3), 445–468 (2019)
8. Castellano, C., Fortunato, S., Loreto, V.: Statistical physics of social dynamics.
Reviews of Modern Physics 81(2), 591–646 (2009)
9. Chen, W., Lakshmanan, L.V., Castillo, C.: Information and Influence Propagation
in Social Networks. Synthesis Lectures on Data Management 5(4), 1–177 (oct
2013). https://doi.org/10.2200/S00527ED1V01Y201308DTM037
10. Chinellato, D.D., Epstein, I.R., Braha, D., Bar-Yam, Y., de Aguiar, M.A.M.: Dy-
namical Response of Networks Under External Perturbations: Exact Results. Jour-
nal of Statistical Physics 159(2), 221–230 (apr 2015)
11. Clifford, P., Sudbury, A.: A model for spatial conflict. Biometrika 60(3), 581–588
(1973). https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/60.3.581
12. De, A., Bhattacharya, S., Ganguly, N.: Demarcating Endogenous and Exogenous
Opinion Diffusion Process on Social Networks. In: Proceedings of the 2018 World
Wide Web Conference on World Wide Web - WWW ’18. pp. 549–558. ACM Press,
New York, New York, USA (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3178876.3186121,
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3178876.3186121
13. Domingos, P., Richardson, M.: Mining the network value of customers. In: Pro-
ceedings of the Seventh ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data mining - KDD ’01. pp. 57–66. ACM Press (2001)
14. Even-Dar, E., Shapira, A.: A note on maximizing the spread of influence in social
networks. Information Processing Letters 111(4), 184–187 (jan 2011)
15. Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., Muller, E.: Talk of the network: A complex systems look
at the underlying process of word-of-mouth. Marketing Letters 12(3), 211–223
(Aug 2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011122126881
12 G. Romero Moreno et al.
16. Granovetter, M.: Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of
Sociology 83(6), 1420–1443 (may 1978). https://doi.org/10.1086/226707
17. Holley, R.A., Liggett, T.M.: Ergodic theorems for weakly interacting infinite sys-
tems and the voter model. The Annals of Probability 3(4), 643–663 (1975)
18. Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, E.: Maximizing the spread of influence through a
social network. In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. pp. 137–146. KDD ’03, ACM (2003)
19. Kuhlman, C.J., Kumar, V.A., Ravi, S.: Controlling opinion propagation in online
networks. Computer Networks 57(10), 2121–2132 (jul 2013)
20. Liu, Y.Y., Slotine, J.J., Baraba´si, A.L.: Controllability of complex networks. Nature
473(7346), 167–173 (may 2011). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature10011
21. Masuda, N., Gilbert, N., Redner, S.: Heterogeneous voter models. Phys. Rev. E
82, 010103 (2010)
22. Masuda, N.: Opinion control in complex networks. New Journal of Physics 17,
1–11 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033031
23. McFaul, M., Kass, B.: Understanding Putins Intentions and Actions in the 2016
U.S. Presidential Election. Tech. rep., Standford University (Jun 2019)
24. Mobilia, M.: Does a single zealot affect an infinite group of voters? Phys. Rev.
Lett. 91, 028701 (2003)
25. Palombi, F., Ferriani, S., Toti, S.: Influence of periodic external fields in multiagent
models with language dynamics. Physical Review E 96(6), 062311 (dec 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.96.062311
26. Porfiri, M., di Bernardo, M.: Criteria for global pinning-controllability of complex
networks. Automatica 44(12), 3100–3106 (dec 2008)
27. Ramos, M., Shao, J., Reis, S.D.S., Anteneodo, C., Andrade, J.S., Havlin, S., Makse,
H.A.: How does public opinion become extreme? Sci. Rep. 5, 10032 (2015)
28. Redner, S.: Reality-inspired voter models: A mini-review. Comptes Rendus
Physique 20(4), 275–292 (may 2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crhy.2019.05.004
29. Romero Moreno, G., Tran-Thanh, L., Brede, M.: Continuous influence maximisa-
tion for the voter dynamics: Analytical solution for leader-follower networks and
gradient ascent algorithm. Manuscript submitted for publication (2019)
30. Sˆırbu, A., Loreto, V., Servedio, V.D.P., Tria, F.: Opinion Dynamics: Models, Exten-
sions and External Effects, pp. 363–401. Springer International Publishing (2017)
31. Wilder, B., Ou, H.C., de la Haye, K., Tambe, M.: Optimizing network structure
for preventative health. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. pp. 841–849. AAMAS ’18, Interna-
tional Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC
(2018), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3237383.3237507
32. Wilder, B., Vorobeychik, Y.: Controlling elections through social influence. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiA-
gent Systems. pp. 265–273. AAMAS ’18, International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC (2018)
33. Yildiz, E., Ozdaglar, A., Acemoglu, D., Saberi, A., Scaglione, A.: Binary Opinion
Dynamics with Stubborn Agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and Compu-
tation 1(4), 1–30 (dec 2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2538508
34. Zhang, H., Vorobeychik, Y., Letchford, J., Lakkaraju, K.: Data-driven
agent-based modeling, with application to rooftop solar adoption. Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 30(6), 1023–1049 (nov 2016).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-016-9326-8
